Fourth Down Prelude: Beyond Just The Red Zone
The MMQ concerns himself with college football and doesn’t much like the pros, but NFL football makes for acceptable background noise on Monday night while researching college football stats and looking ahead to the next week of games. During last week’s New York-Dallas game, it was surprising to see such disbelief expressed on the internet when the Cowboys, trailing 38-20, went for it on fourth down and goal from the Giants’ 6-yard line with under nine minutes left in regulation. One could question the decision, but just barely; only when the game is still relatively young (first half) should a team kick a field goal when trailing by 18 or more points.
Shortly after seeing a number of comments burying Wade Phillips (who normally makes brutally bad strategic moves, but not in that case… ironically because his team was getting its butt kicked so badly), the MMQ then looked on in horror while looking through play-by-play logs from week eight’s games. Late in the third quarter of the Indiana-Illinois game, Hoosier coach Bill Lynch – with his team trailing 29-10 – kicked a field goal on fourth-and-goal from the Illini 4 to make the score 29-13. Yeesh.
From those two examples alone, it certainly appears that Football Nation – whether it’s a coach in Bloomington, Indiana, or collections of fans across this country – needs a primer on decision making in the red zone on fourth-down situations in which the distance to make ranges from 1.6 yards to five yards. It’s time to hit a football equivalent of the Billboard Top 40 and pull out the charts over the next few weeks. This week, we’ll deal with situations pertaining to teams that are leading in the second half (both early and late).
Let’s set up and frame this discussion by establishing a few underlying points:
1) If a team faces six inches or fewer for a first down at ANY point on the field at ANY stage of a game, only a few considerations can ever justify a decision to not pursue a first down or touchdown. Any self-respecting offense should be able to gain six inches or fewer at any time. Only if a normal punt ensures (or comes close to ensuring) the denial of points – as would be the case in the final 30 seconds of a half – should a team punt on fourth-and-one-inch from its own 15, for instance. Only if a team trails by one to three points in the final minute of a game should it kick a field goal on fourth-and-one-inch from an opponent’s 15. The idea should be appreciably clear.
SIDE NOTE UNRELATED TO TOUCHDOWN/FIELD GOAL DECISIONS IN PARTICULAR: Lane Kiffin of USC, while perhaps not facing inches-to-go situations against Oregon, should have been relentless in going for it on fourth down from every point on the field this past Saturday. The teams and coaches who play Oregon and - for that matter - Auburn must play outside the box and ignore conventional wisdom unless their defenses are elite enough to contain the Ducks (or the Tigers). Kiffin, perhaps still thinking that it was okay to lose by a reasonable margin to Oregon (since he was indeed happy to lose by 10 points to Florida in 2009), did not treat this game like the bowl game many thought it would be for USC. Kiffin needed to treat series inside his own 25-yard line as four-down series, at least once it became apparent that Oregon wouldn't be limited to under 30 points. Is it normal to go for it on fourth-and-one from the 15? Of course not. Is Oregon a normal opponent that demands normal responses and actions? No - and that's precisely the point. -M.Z.
2) If the fourth-down distance is anywhere from seven inches to 1.5 yards, the standards for eschewing a first-down or touchdown attempt are not as high, but they still merit attention and discernment, especially as the distance increases. Any situation in which a team faces fourth-and-1.3-yards inside its own 30 would actually demand a punt unless the situation was particularly urgent for the offensive team – there’s little doubt about that particular point.
3) If a team faces a fourth-down situation in which the distance to make is beyond five yards, the first 60 yards of the field should offer due cause to punt the ball unless the scoreboard demands otherwise. If a team faces fourth-and-six from an opponent’s 43 in a one-score game in the third quarter, it should normally punt unless a specific aspect of the game flow is clearly working against its defense, or something to that effect.
4) Teams should very rarely punt inside an opponent’s 40-yard line. A unique time-and-score situation or a daunting fourth-down distance to make for a first down (nine yards or more, but not the five-to-eight range, coverable with a basic slant, out, or sit-down pass route) can justify a punt from an opponent’s 38, but any appreciably moderate fourth-down distance should demand an attempt to achieve something on offense (if not a long field goal in the event that the scoreboard makes a field goal valuable).
And now, let’s indeed hit those charts, with a specific focus on red-zone situations, not the entirety of the football field.
Generic Charts For Red-Zone Fourth-Down Situations With 1.6 to 5 Yards To Make For A First Down Or Touchdown
Chart No. 1: When Leading in the First 22-24 Minutes Of The Second Half (Within The Second Half Until The Midway Point Of The Fourth Quarter)
GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT APPLY TO NEARLY ALL FOURTH-DOWN SITUATIONS: The closer a team is to the goal line, the more a team should consider going for the touchdown or first down; the closer to the 20-yard line (i.e., the front boundary of the red zone and not the back boundary), the more a team should lean toward the field goal; if this situation occurs earlier in the second half, one should lean more toward the field goal and bank points for the endgame phase; if this situation occurs toward the end of this game range – near the 10-minute mark of the fourth quarter – the more a team should consider the aggressive approach and go for the first down or touchdown.
Plus 1 point – Seek the touchdown or first down in a high-scoring game or in the face of an excellent offensive opponent; seek the field goal in a low-scoring game or in the face of a poor offensive opponent. Similarly, seek the touchdown if your offense is your team’s best strength, and seek the field goal if your offense is weak and/or if your defense is strong. In a college football context, this means that you would more likely seek a touchdown against Oregon, Navy and Auburn, while leaning toward a field goal against Vanderbilt, UCLA and Boston College. The chance to get to an eight-point margin is significant because it forces the opposing coach to determine if he must chase a point before the final few minutes of regulation time. Moreover, even if you get three points here, the other team will get substantially better field position after the ensuing kickoff. Also, another field goal after a four-point lead gets you to a seven-point advantage, NOT the eight- or nine-point “magic margins” that either force an opponent to go for two or (even better) come up with two scores. On the other hand, a seven-point margin is definitely better than five or six.
Plus 2 points – Lean more toward a field goal than you would if leading by only one point. After gaining a five-point lead with a field goal here, a team could establish an eight-point margin with another field goal. Moreover, getting a five-point margin forces the other team to risk (prematurely) going for two if it gets a touchdown. A subsequent failure of your opponent’s two-point try can wind up giving you a key extra point that you can bring to the table in the fourth quarter.
Plus 3 – Either approach works well in this situation; if it’s the kind of game in which it seems that more touchdowns are likely to be scored, go for the first down or touchdown; if you sense that defenses are tightening and that you have a handle on the other team’s offense, kick the field goal. Because of your three-point lead, a field goal cannot give your opponent the lead. Therefore, you are in position to be uniquely aggressive here. On the other hand, if you go up by six points in this situation and then add another field goal (just like the above scenario), you’re nine points ahead. Kicking a field goal up by three sets you up nicely for a two-possession advantage even without the benefit of a touchdown.
Plus 4 – field goal. Four to seven points is a no-brainer. Getting to a point where a touchdown cannot beat you (and can only tie you) is too important to ignore.
Plus 5 – field goal. This is one of the “magic margin makers.” If you can get to eight or nine points, you reach a coveted position of added scoreboard leverage. At eight points – which is relevant here with the five-point spread and a pending field-goal attempt – you don’t just lead by one possession; you lead by “one possession plus.” An opponent doesn’t have a nearly automatic PAT to tie you, but must instead convert a dicey 2-point conversion to catch you on the scoreboard. That’s why a field goal when leading by five is always a sound decision.
Plus 6 – field goal. All the reasons that apply to the above example only apply even more fully when leading by six points. Crossing the “possession threshold” from a one-score lead to a two-score lead (six to nine points) makes this a nearly automatic decision under any circumstance.
Plus 7 – field goal. This move also increases your lead from one to two possessions, and if you fail on a fourth-down attempt, you still know that you can’t get beaten with a touchdown and a PAT. Going for it in this situation has a certain degree of logic, despite the basic math. However, the math still wins out in the end.
Plus 8 – Consider going for the touchdown or first down if this situation emerges earlier in the second half or if you’re facing a turbo-charged offense such as the one fielded by Oregon. However, one should kick the field goal if this situation emerges near the midway point of the fourth quarter or if a team’s opponent has a poor (Boston College-level) offense. Eight to 11 points technically satisfies the criterion of a change in a possession threshold from one score to two, but on the other hand, an eight-point lead is “one possession plus,” which means that this is a smaller possession-threshold change than the shift from six to nine points or the shift from seven to 10 points. When you examine this situation, a change of eight to 11 really doesn’t do all that much. In fact, it might lead a team to think that it won’t need a two-point try.
Consider this simple scenario: If you go up 11 and your opponent then gets a touchdown and PAT to trim your lead to just four, you can go up by seven points with an additional field goal of your own. As a result of these events, you’re up just one possession, and your opponent, while not being able to beat you with a touchdown, does have the benefit of not needing a two-pointer just to tie you. Going for a touchdown here can get you to a 15-point spread, where you not only force a team to get two touchdowns, but at least one 2-point try. This is definitely a situation in which to be aggressive: With an eight-point lead, you’re already in a spot where your opponent is in need of a conversion just to tie you.
Plus 9 – Consider the touchdown/first down against elite offenses or in high-scoring games; consider the field goal more against weak offenses or in low-scoring games. Extending from nine points to 12 achieves a much bigger change in terms of the scoreboard calculus – it forces an opponent to score two touchdowns, so if this situation occurs with roughly 10 minutes left in the fourth quarter, the field goal is increasingly valuable. However, it must also be said here that with a nine-point lead, you’re already up by two scores and therefore enjoy a cushion. You are in a position where you can afford to be aggressive. Moreover, if you get the first down or touchdown, your team can then attain a 16-point margin. If leading by eight points is “one possession plus,” a 16-point lead – while technically just two possessions – is very nearly as good as a three-possession lead because of the fact that converting two 2-point conversions carries appreciably longer odds than converting only one of them. A 16-point deficit is a real pain in the neck for the trailing team.
Plus 10 – If you have a great offense that you trust, or if you’re deeply uncertain of your defense’s ability to stop your opponent’s offense, you should go for the first down or touchdown here, especially in the early stages of the second half. As you move toward the midway point of the fourth quarter, you should lean more toward the field goal. This is certainly a situation in which a coach should be attuned to his personnel and on-field matchups. As a favorite, a coach should probably choose the field goal, since it will set him up to further extend his lead to 16 with a second field goal. On the other hand, another coach might want to go for it and extend his lead from 10 to 17 with one play, thereby putting the game out of reach by acquiring a three-possession bulge. Strong arguments exist for either side of thought. It should be said that in this position, a coach has good options to choose from; if he makes a questionable decision here (as opposed to, let’s say, a three-point lead), the consequences are not as severe; hence, the level of criticism should not be as forceful.
Plus 11 – Seek the field goal in almost every circumstance. Much like going from up four to up seven, a field goal here ensures that a team is not susceptible to defeat with two touchdowns; that’s a safe place to be. Moreover, because a 12-point lead already means that an opponent must score two touchdowns, it is here – with an 11-point lead – that a field goal is actually more valuable.
Plus 12 – field goal. You force a team to get at least one 2-point conversion by extending to 15 with a field goal.
Plus 13 – field goal. This is also a more valuable field goal than a three-pointer kicked with a 12-point lead. If you reach a 16-point margin and force a team to get two 2-point conversions, you are – as stated earlier – leading by more than just two possessions in a certain sense (albeit not technically).
Plus 14 – field goal. Being able to reach a 17-point (three-possession) margin carries undeniable and overwhelming value.
Plus 15 or more – field goal. Just collect points and have them add up on your side. If your opponent makes a late comeback, you’ll be glad you “stashed points away in storage.”
Now, let’s see what situations change as the fourth quarter moves along.
Chart No. 2: When Leading With 4 to 8 Minutes Left In The Fourth Quarter
This is when you don’t need to know the math (which has already been explained in the above chart) so much as the expectations of what your opponent can achieve as the clock ticks down to the final four minutes of regulation time. Situations here can’t be treated as generically as they would be in the third quarter or the first few minutes of the fourth quarter. We’ll provide more specific examples, of course; as always, it makes a huge difference if you’re playing Oregon’s offense or Vanderbilt’s offense, and if you’re playing Oklahoma State’s defense or TCU’s defense.
Plus 1 point – Seek a touchdown or first down against Oregon’s offense or Oklahoma State’s defense, and a field goal against Vanderbilt’s offense or TCU’s defense. Seek a touchdown or first down as the distance to make decreases, especially less than two and a half yards, and seek a field goal if the distance to make is three yards or more. Seek a touchdown the closer you are to the goal line, and seek a field goal the closer you are to the 20. Seek the touchdown the closer you are to the four-minute mark of regulation time, and seek the field goal if you’re closer to the eight-minute mark in the fourth quarter.
EXAMPLE No. 1: If faced with fourth-and-five from the 19 against Oregon’s offense or OSU’s defense with at least five minutes left, kick the field goal and get to the four-point margin, realizing that you will probably get the ball back and would need only a field goal to tie should you give up a touchdown on your ensuing defensive possession. The fact that you’d be facing a poor defense would elevate your chances of getting that tying field goal.
EXAMPLE No. 2: If faced with fourth down and 1.7 yards to go from the 3 against Vanderbilt’s offense or TCU’s defense with 7:30 left, go for the first down/touchdown. When considering red-zone decisions, the end of the red zone (the front end, near the 20, or the back end, near the goal line) certainly matters, as does the distance to make. If you’re inside the 5 and the distance to make is two yards or fewer, your position of increased leverage not only justifies, but strongly encourages, a more aggressive approach. If you fail, you still have the opposition – with a poor offense – pinned inside its own 5. If you consider your own offense to be appreciably good, this is precisely the kind of situation in which you must trust your offensive unit to do something special and get an eight-point lead, which would put an opponent on the ropes.
Plus 2 points – Seek a touchdown or first down against Cameron Newton in accordance with the principles established above: namely, being closer to the goal line, with a distance to make that is less than 2.5 yards, near the four-minute mark of regulation. Seek a field goal against Boston College’s offense in accordance with the principles established above: namely, being closer to the 20, with a distance to make of three to five yards, near the eight-minute mark of regulation.
The important point to establish here is that a coach should be much more aggressive with a two-point lead than with a one-point lead, for the simple reason that a touchdown pushes a lead to nine points, and hence, two scores. If you have a good chance to go up nine against Auburn with four minutes left, you should definitely pursue the first down and touchdown on fourth-and-two from the 3. The reward outstrips the risk. If you’re closer to the eight-minute mark and you know you have a good offense, perhaps you should take the three points, go up by five, and see what your defense is made of. Generally, though, a coach should not leave the door open to defeat at the hands of a brilliant superstar quarterback. If you’re appreciably close to registering that kill shot, do it. You’re in a much better position to achieve said kill shot if you’re leading by two points rather than one.
Plus 3 – Seek a touchdown or first down in most circumstances; fourth-and-five from the 20 with seven minutes left would be an obvious exception.
Why is the three-point spread different from the one- or two-point spreads? Very simply, a field goal cannot beat you. Therefore, armed with that bit of leverage, the value of kicking a field goal diminishes as the endgame phase approaches. Michigan State, down by six after a Northwestern field goal, took a late 28-27 lead against the Wildcats on Oct. 23, en route to a 35-27 win. Wisconsin, down by six after an Iowa field goal, scored a late touchdown to nudge the Hawkeyes on that same afternoon, 31-30. The value of a touchdown far exceeds the negative consequences of a fourth-down failure in the latter stages of a three-point game; conversely, the value of a field goal is very small in comparison with the benefits that can be gained from a touchdown in such a situation. If coaches don’t handle this particular situation properly, they deserve a heightened level of criticism. Handling a one- or two-point lead is an entirely different circumstance in which caution is much more acceptable.
Plus 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 points – Seek the field goal in almost all circumstances. Only if the prospect of overtime represents a uniquely worrisome or alarming situation should a coach go for the touchdown with a four-point lead. With a lead of anywhere from five to nine points, a field goal is a no-brainer at an advanced stage of the fourth quarter.
Plus 10 – Seek the touchdown or first down if you’re playing Oregon’s offense or Cam Newton, provided that the yard line and the down-and-distance situations are manageable, in accordance with previously-established parameters (under 2.5 yards to go, inside the 5, closer to the four-minute mark of the fourth quarter). Seek the field goal if you’re playing UCLA’s offense or must face LSU’s defense.
Similar to the calculus involved in a three-point game, this is a situation in which coaches can afford to be aggressive, and therefore press the issue. A touchdown and a field goal by the opponent cannot lead to a defeat, while the scoring of a touchdown in this situation creates a 17-point (three-possession) lead. The rewards of success outstrip the consequences of failure, even though adding a field goal can certainly not be viewed as a “bad” decision.
Plus 11 or more – field goal, end of story.
APPENDIX: When Leading With Under 4 Minutes Left In The Fourth Quarter
As a game winds its way toward a conclusion, a few basic points need to be understood: First, decisions made with leads of four points or more are almost always going to be field-goal decisions, so they really don’t need to be discussed. Second, a three-point lead will almost always demand an aggressive approach unless the down-and-distance situation is as bad as it can be (fourth-and-five from the 20 or something close to it). Third, an opponent’s offensive quality, combined with its amount of remaining timeouts, will substantially affect the nature of any decision made within the final two minutes of regulation. This is especially true of Auburn, a team with a fantastic running quarterback, but a player (Cam Newton) who has not led a winning two-minute drill propelled primarily by the passing game.
Let’s deal with some specific situations, then: If you lead Auburn by one or two points with only 1:30 left, and the Tigers lack any timeouts, kick the field goal and force Newton to march the length of the field in a classic hurry-up/no-huddle mode. If Auburn has all three timeouts left with 1:30 to go and you’re facing a fourth-and-two from the 4, go for the first down/touchdown and plunge the dagger into the gut, not giving Newton a chance to use the running game and then burn timeouts after open-field runs. The larger rationale should be clear: The weaker your opponent is – either in its ability to throw the ball or in its ability to stop the clock – the more you should kick the field goal when leading by only one or two points in the final minutes of regulation. The stronger your opponent is, the more you need to consider going for the first down or touchdown to win the game right then and there.
There are exceptions to the rule, of course. Take Oregon, for instance.
With 3:15 left and a one-point lead against Oregon’s offense, you’re in a tricky spot. Oregon can score so quickly that you might get the ball back. Interestingly enough, Oregon might be in more of a comfort zone if you lead the Ducks (by one point) with 1:40 left than with 3:15 left. Darron Thomas could lead a typical 95-second scoring drive within normal rhythms and leave no time on the scoreboard for your offense. Therefore, it might paradoxically make more sense to kick a field goal and grab a four-point lead on Oregon with 1:40 left, not 3:15 left. Protecting yourself against an Oregon field goal carries more weight near the end of the game. This runs counter to the notion that you should go for kill shots as you approach the end of regulation time; Oregon demands counter-intuitive thinking. This is not to say that kicking a field goal when leading the Ducks by a point with 3:15 left is dumb; it only means that it makes less sense than kicking the same field goal with 1:40 left. Against most teams, it makes more sense to go for it on fourth-and-two from the 3 in a one-point game with 1:40 left; Oregon would definitely be an exception to the rule.
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